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Abstract: The Rogoﬀ (1985) proposition that it is socially optimal to delegate monetary policy to a conser-
vative central banker has been challenged by a literature that argues that if there is an inﬂation-averse monopoly
union in the economy, it is optimal to delegate monetary policy to an “ultra-liberal” central banker, that is,
a central banker that is interested only in stabilizing output. In this paper, we examine whether introducing
wage indexing into the later models has any eﬀect on the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness.
JEL classiﬁcation: E24, E52, E58, J51
1 Introduction
Rogoﬀ (1985) showed that the inﬂationary bias of monetary policy that arises in the Barro-Gordon
(1983) framework could be reduced, or even eliminated, if the government delegates monetary policy
to an independent and “conservative”2 central banker. Extending the Rogoﬀ framework, a series of
authors have embedded wage indexing into the relevant literature of time inconsistency in monetary
policy. Mourmouras (1997) shows that wage indexation is inﬂationary in the sense that it weakens
the will of government to ﬁght inﬂation and delegates monetary policy to a central banker that is less
inﬂation-averse than in the original Rogoﬀ model. Similar results have been found by many authors
(e.g. Hutchison and Walsh, 1998).
The Rogoﬀ approach has been questioned and is often reversed when unions are assumed non-
atomistic, in the sense that their target functions include not only an employment target, but also the
costs of inﬂation. This union “inﬂation-averseness” has been justiﬁed on the grounds that a monopoly
union encompasses most of society, which in itself is inﬂation-averse3. In particular, if there is one
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2“Conservative” in the sense that the central banker dislikes inﬂation more than society.
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1monopoly inﬂation-averse union it is often found optimal to delegate monetary policy to an “ultra-
liberal” central banker, that is, to a central banker that cares only about employment and is inﬂation
indiﬀerent, which is the opposite of Rogoﬀ’s proposition (e.g. Cubitt, 1995, Skott, 1997, Lawler, 2000).
The intuition behind this result is that the trade union recognizes that increasing its wage mark-up
leads to under-employment. This in turn gives an increasing incentive to the central bank to create
surprise inﬂation. An inﬂation-indiﬀerent central banker will produce very high inﬂation for even
the slightest positive mark-up and this is costly for the union. Recognizing this outcome, the union
moderates its wage claims and the central banker simply looses interest in creating surprise inﬂation
as employment reaches its equilibrium level, while inﬂation and the wage premium are zero.
Cubitt (1995), Skott (1997), and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) examine only a deterministic en-
vironment. Lawler (2000) extends this framework to include stochastic shocks in the production
function and ﬁnds that the “ultra-liberal” result is oﬀset. In particular, Lawler ﬁnds that if stochastic
shocks are present, it is optimal to delegate monetary policy to a central banker who shares the same
preferences with the rest of society (or the government).
This paper examines the eﬀects of wage indexing on central bank conservativeness when there is a
monopoly “inﬂation-averse” union in the economy and only some of the wage contracts are indexed.
2 The Model
The model is built around Lawler (2000) and extended to allow for indexed wage contracts as in Gray
(1976) and Fischer (1983). Production is described by the following Cobb-Douglas function:
y = al + θ (1)
where y is output, l is employment, a is the elasticity of output with respect to employment, and θ is a
white noise productivity shock [θ ∼ WN(0,σ2
θ)]4. Proﬁt-maximization behavior leads to the following
are not indexed.
4Time scripts have been eliminated to reduce clutter.
2labour demand:
ld = −β(w − p − θ) (2)
where β = (1−α)−1 and the constant is ignored. Assuming that labour supply is ﬁxed and normalized
to zero (ls = 0) we derive the competitive Warlasian equilibrium for labour as:
˜ w = p + θ (3)
We assume that some of the wage contracts are indexed and for those that are not unions set a mark-
up (ϕ) over the expected market-clearing wage. Therefore, the real nominal wage is determined by
(4) below:
w = E ˜ w + ζ(p − pe) + ϕ (4)
where ζ is the wage indexing parameter.5 Taking expectations for (3) and combining with (4):
w = pe + ζ(p − pe) + ϕ (5)
The government’s loss function entails two components: deviations of employment and deviations
from inﬂation and is described by below:
  = (l −   l)2 + λ(π −   π)2 (6)
where π is inﬂation,   l is the government’s target for employment, and λ is the relative weight attached
to inﬂation. The inﬂation target (  π) is assumed zero. The central banker’s loss function is described
by the following equation:
 I = (l −   l)2 + (λ + ǫ)(π −   π)2 (7)
where ǫ is the extra weight on inﬂation vis-à-vis the government. Throughout this paper we will refer
to ǫ as the degree of central bank conservitaveness (hereafter CBC). Equation (8) describes the union’s
objective function:
 u = (1 + δ)(l − lu)2 + λπ2 (8)
5The wage indexing rule used here (ﬁrst two components of the equation) is very common in the literature (e.g. Gray,
1976; Fischer, 1983; Mourmouras, 1997).
3where lu is the union’s target level of employment which is less than society’s, and δ ￿ 0 reﬂects the
union members’ preferences and is taken exogenously. The latter term in the equation reﬂects the
inﬂation averseness of the monopoly union.
3 Equilibrium
The game is solved via backward induction.
3.1 The central banker’s choice of inﬂation
We derive equilibrium employment by substituting (4) into (2), using the fact that p − pe = π − πe,
and imposing the condition that employment is demand-driven:
l = F(π − πe) + β(θ − φ) (9)
where F = β(1 − ζ).To ﬁnd the central bank’s choice of inﬂation, ﬁrst we substitute (9) into (7),
minimize and solve for π:
π =
F[πe + βϕ + F  l]
A + F2 −
βθ
A + F2 (10)
where A = λ + ǫ. The second term of the above equation (10) captures the central banker’s eﬀort to
oﬀset the productivity shock We now substitute π and πe into l to ﬁnd the ﬁnal expression for labour:
l = −βϕ +
βA
A + F2θ (11)
3.2 The union’s choice of the mark-up
To derive the union’s optimal choice for the mark-up (ϕ) we substitute π and l into the union’s loss
function (8) and take expectations for  u. After taking the ﬁrst order condition we derive ϕ as:
ϕ =
λF2  l − (1 + δ)A2lu
β[(1 + δ)(ǫ + λ)2 + λF2]2 (12)
It is clear from the above equation that the mark-up is dependent on ǫ. Diﬀerentiating the expression




(1 + δ)λ(ǫ + λ)F2(  l + lu)
β[(1 + δ)(ǫ + λ)2 + λF2]2 > 0 (13)
4Equation (13) shows us that the greater weight the central banker places on inﬂation, that is, the more
inﬂation-averse (“conservative”) the central banker is, the less costly it is for the union to increase its
mark-up, which in turn produces inﬂation and under-employment. Extending the model for multiple
unions does not change the qualitative results.
3.3 The government’s choice of the central banker
The government derives the level of CBC that minimizes its loss function. We substitute the expres-
sions we found for ϕ, π, and l into the government’s loss function, take expectations, minimize and
solve for ǫ. After ﬁnding the ﬁrst order condition we separate the result into two components: i)
Deterministic and ii) Stochastic.
3.3.1 Deterministic case
The ﬁrst order condition is:
(1 + δ)2(ǫ + λ)2[(1 − ζ)2β2λ + (ǫ + λ)2](lu −   l)
[(1 − ζ)2β2λ + (1 + δ)(ǫ + λ)2]2 = 0 (14)
From the above it is clear to see that the government’s loss function is minimized when ǫ = −λ. This
is the case for the “ultra-liberal” central banker.6 Contrary to the case where unions were considered
“atomistic” (indiﬀerent to inﬂation), wage indexing does not have any eﬀect on the optimal degree of
central bank conservativeness.7 We can also see this result diagrammatically (Fiqure 1).
[insert ﬁgure 1 somewhere here]
3.3.2 Stochastic case
The ﬁrst order condition is:
ǫβ2[(1 − ζ)2β2λ + (ǫ + λ)2]
[(1 − ζ)2β2 + ǫ + λ]
σ2
θ = 0 (15)
6This is the exact result of Lawler’s (2000) model, which does not have wage indexing nor employment targets for
the government and the central banker.
7The loss function is also minimized when there is full indexing (ζ = 1). However, in this extreme case the Phillips
curve is vertical and the model collapses.
5In the stochastic case the optimal degree of CBC is zero (ǫ = 0). This is shown in Figure 2.
[insert ﬁgure 2 somewhere here]
With stochastic productivity shocks the “ultra-liberal” result is oﬀset and it is optimal to delegate
monetary policy to a central banker that shares the same preferences with the rest of society. However,
wage indexing does not have any impact on the optimal CBC and the result remains anti-Rogoﬀ. The
discrepancy between the deterministic and stochastic case is due to the fact that in the latter case the
central banker oﬀsets the shock. In equilibrium, employment is at its equilibrium level while inﬂation
and the wage mark-up are zero.
4 Some Extensions
Having found that wage indexing has no eﬀect on the optimal degree of CBC when unions are inﬂation
averse, we now turn to the case where the government enforces an ala Walsh (1995) linear inﬂation
contract upon the central banker. In particular, the central banker’s loss function is now:
 I = (l −   l)2 + (λ + ǫ)(π −   π)2 + 2γπ (16)
where γ is the additional cost of inﬂation imposed on the central banker via the inﬂation contract.
The model is solved as before with the diﬀerence that the government now also chooses the optimal
γ. The central banker’s choice of inﬂation is:
π =
−γA − βAθF − γF2 + βAFϕ + βϕF3 + F  l
A(A + F2)
(17)
The equilibrium level of employment remains the same with equation (9). Solving the union’s choice
for the mark-up (ϕ) we ﬁnd:
ϕ =
−(1 + δ)A2lu − λF(−γ + F  l)
β[(1 + δ)A2 + λF2]
(18)
Once again ϕ is increasing in ǫ. Solving the government’s choice for γ we ﬁnd:
γ =
−δ(1 + δ)A2F(lu −   l)
(1 + δ)2A2 + λF2 (19)
6We now proceed to ﬁnd the government’s choice for the central banker using the values for π, l, ϕ and
γ that were derived above. In the deterministic context the ﬁrst order condition is:
(1 + δ)2(ǫ + λ)2(lu −   l)2
(1 − ζ)2β2λ + (1 + δ)2(ǫ + λ)2 = 0 (20)
As previously the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness is ǫ = −λ. This implies that the
optimal choice of the contract parameter is γ = 0. Therefore existence of the contract is indiﬀerent in
this model. Similar results also hold in the stochastic context:
β2[ǫ2 + 2ǫλ + λ((ζ − 1)2β2 + λ)]ǫ
[(ζ − 1)2β2 + ǫ + λ]2 σ2
θ = 0 (21)
where the resulting optimal values are ǫ = 0 and γ = 0.
Assuming that the government and the central banker do not have employment targets8 yields
the exact same results as previously. The above results also hold if the government imposes a linear
inﬂation target on the central banker.
5 Conclusions
In conclusion, contrary to the Rogoﬀ-type models, when the union(s) in the economy are inﬂation-
averse, wage indexing has no eﬀect on the optimal degree of CBC. We must point out that the result(s)
depend crucially on the assumption that the union(s) are (even slightly) inﬂation-averse (0 < δ < 1).
As δ exceeds unity, Rogoﬀ’s conservative central banker is restored as the union(s) cares less about
inﬂation vis-à-vis employment.
8This is similar to Lawler’s (2000) model. The lack of employment targets for the central banker is conserdered more
realistic for Europe as the ECB claims that it does not have an employment target.
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8Figure 1: Deterministic case with employment targets
Figure 2: Stochastic case with employment targets
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